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Planetary Protection in the New Space
Era: Science and Governance
Thomas Cheney1,2*, Christopher Newman1,3, Karen Olsson-Francis1, Scott Steele1,2,
Victoria Pearson1 and Simon Lee1,2
1AstrobiologyOU, Faculty of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics, The Open University, Milton Keynes, United
Kingdom, 2Faculty of Business and Law, The Open University Law School, The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom,
3Faculty of Business and Law, Northumbria Law School, Northumbria University, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom
Committee of Space Research’s Planetary Protection Policy is a triumph of technocratic
governance in the global sphere. The Policy is produced by a group of scientific experts
and subsequently enjoys high regard among the scientific and space community.
However, as Committee of Space Research is an independent organization without
any legal mandate the Planetary Protection Policy is an example of so-called “soft law”
or a non-binding international instrument, in short, no one is under any legal obligation to
comply with them. The policy is linked to Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and its
provision calling for the avoidance of “harmful contamination” of the Moon and other
celestial bodies. While space activities beyond Earth orbit have been the exclusive preserve
of government scientific space agencies this has posed little problem. However as private
and “non-science” space activities proliferate and begin to spread their reach beyond Earth
orbit, the Planetary Protection Policy is being tested. This paper will examine the challenges
of developing and maintaining an effective planetary protection regime in this “New Space”
era. This will involve looking at the existing policies, as well as the governance framework
they sit within. However, it is also necessary to consider and understand the scientific basis
not just for the specifics of the policy itself but the necessity of it. Finally, this paper will
consider whether a broader “environmental” framework is needed as space activities
diversity in type and location.
Keywords: COSPAR, planetary protection, space law, space governance, enforcement, environment, astrobiology
INTRODUCTION
The Committee of Space Research’s (COSPAR) Planetary Protection Policy (PPP) (COSPAR 2020a)
has sought to protect the space environment from “harmful contamination” which would endanger
the integrity of the scientific exploration of outer space including the search for life. The PPP predates
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty/OST) (OST 1967). The PPP’s
non-binding status has allowed a flexible and organic development enabling the Policy to be updated
as scientific understanding has developed. Yet, as the geopolitical order shifts, new challenges to the
governance of space emerge. This discussion will examine the threat to the consensus that has
developed in respect of planetary protection caused by a shift in space exploration. The traditional
science-led approach to the exploration of celestial bodies is now being augmented by non-
governmental, non-scientific actors looking to pursue commercial activities in outer space. These
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new actors, some of whom have already expressed skepticism
about the current arrangements, will test the way in which
planetary protection is enshrined in future missions to other
planets.
Summer 2020 has seen the launch of several Mars bound
scientific missions, including the first effort from the UAE and
China’s first independent mission.1 Further, the United States has
unveiled further details for its Artemis program which intends to
return humans to the Moon during the 2020s and involves a
commercial lunar payload service in order to open opportunities
for private sector activities on the Moon (NASA 2020b). Elon
Musk, Jeff Bezos and others continue to advance their plans for
non-governmental activities in outer space. Space governance,
and planetary protection, is evolving to deal with these
developments, the United States has proposed the Artemis
Accords (NASA 2020b), NASA has updated their planetary
protection policy (NASA 2020c, NASA 2020d), COSPAR also
updated the international planetary protection policy in June
2020 (COSPAR 2020a). Planetary protection is perhaps more
important as ever as the number of actors and the diversity of
their activities increase. Private and non-governmental space
activities present a particular challenge given the status of the
COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy in international law and the
motivations and intentions of some of these new actors. Non-
binding guidelines rely on parties caring about their objectives,
however, States have an ability, and a responsibility, to ensure
responsible conduct by their nationals and non-governmental
entities, in outer space and that includes ensuring adherence to
the principles of planetary protection. However, as issues such as
space debris demonstrate, it is also necessary to consider whether
a broader environmental perspective is needed, whether it is
necessary to protect the outer space as an environment, to ensure
future use for a range of activities.
This article will start by critiquing the extant planetary
protection principles, why they are necessary and their
position within international space governance. The discussion
will then explore the issues of enforcement in international law,
particularly of “non-binding” norms (the so-called ‘soft law’
provisions), before discussing whether there is a need for a
refocusing of international efforts to protect the space
environment.
The COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy
The requirement to protect natural celestial bodies has been
recognized by both the scientific and legal communities since
the early days of space exploration, but this has led to divergence
in approach (Tennen 2004). The concept of planetary protection,
while recognized by both communities, is emphasized by the legal
community to be concerned with prevention of harmful
contamination of celestial bodies. For the scientific
community, it refers to the need to ensure that pristine
celestial bodies are not contaminated by terrestrial biological
(or organic) contamination (forward contamination),
specifically in order to avoid compromising the search for
extraterrestrial life in the Solar System (Coustenis et al., 2019).
It also concerns protection of the Earth’s biosphere from the
return of (potential) biological extraterrestrial materials
(backward contamination). These principles underpin agreed
international practices which have evolved as our
understanding of the boundaries of life on Earth and
elsewhere in the Solar System has progressed (Rummel and
Billings, 2004) and as there has been an increase in
commercial activity and exploration, including life detection
and sample return missions.
Internationally, technical aspects of planetary protection are
developed though deliberations between the space agencies and
international scientific organizations, and recommendations are
made COSPAR (Rettberg et al., 2016). The COPSAR Planetary
Protection Policy (PPP) (COSPAR 2020a) defines the specific
technical guidelines (COSPAR 2020b). The policy is based on two
rationales: 1) to ensure that the conduct of scientific investigation
of possible extra-terrestrial life forms, precursors, and remnants is
not be jeopardized; and 2) the Earth must be protected from the
potential hazard posed by extraterrestrial matter carried by a
spacecraft returning from an interplanetary mission (Coustenis
et al., 2019).
To date, the COSPAR PPP has identified five categories for
planetary protection requirements depending on the type of
mission, the target body, and the type of scientific
investigations involved. For Category I mission, no PP
measures are needed, but from II to V, the PP regulations
become increasing stringent depending on the scientific focus
of the particular mission on the astrobiological relevance of their
individual mission target, as shown in Table 1. These missions
include flybys, orbiters and landers to Venus, the Moon, Mars,
and the icy moons of the outer Solar System, among other
locations as indicated by Table 1. Examples of such missions
are the Mars 2020, ExoMars and Mars Sample Return missions.
Based on the return of the Apollo samples, samples returned from
the moon are not deemed a threat, and as a result the Moon is
Category II with unrestricted Earth-return.
Category IV, however, recognizes that some missions are to
bodies where extinct and extant life may exist, e.g., the Martian
sub-surface or the sub-surface oceans of icy moons. Indeed, the
significance of this is recognized by specific subdivisions of
Category IV for Mars (IVa, IVb, and IVc), a prime target for
astrobiology investigations. These sub-divisions are dependent on
the mission aims and specific target location: Category IVa
missions do not have objectives relating to the search for life;
Category IVb missions are those investigating the existence of
extant life; Category IVc is for missions that target “special
regions” (e.g., features such as gullies, subsurface cavities,
below 5 m, and Recurring Slope Lineae (RSLs)) (Rummel
2009) even if the objective is not related to the search for life.
“Martian Special Regions”were created in the 2002 COSPAR PPP
for Mars, to recognize regions where terrestrial or native Martian
life might flourish. One obvious determinant for these regions is
the presence of liquid water. For Category IVc missions,
additional restrictions are placed on spacecraft bioburden
(terrestrial contamination) and the feasibility of the target site
to support the replication of terrestrial microbial life is also taken1Previous attempt was done in cooperation with Russia.
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into consideration. As further information is obtained about
proposed targets, the Categories are re-evaluated.
The development of the “Mars Special Regions” highlights the
flexibility of the COPSAR PPP and its evolutionary approach,
which is essential because we are increasing our understanding of
the boundaries within which life can grow on Earth and
increasing our awareness of potential habitability elsewhere in
the Solar System. Planetary protection is critical for enabling
scientists to study the natural environments of celestial bodies
without interfering with possible life forms that may have
developed there. Most importantly, it also helps to preserve
the terrestrial biosphere from possible contamination by
extraterrestrial material. The United Nations Committee of the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), in 2017, noted the
long-term standing role of COSPAR in maintaining a Planetary
Protection Policy as a reference standard for spacefaring nations
and in guiding compliance with Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty (United Nation 2017: 42).
International Space Law
The space governance regime, of which the COSPAR Planetary
Protection Policy is part, is comprised of treaties, such as the
foundational Outer Space Treaty, customary international law,
and non-binding “soft law” such as UN General Assembly
Resolutions and the COSPRAR Planetary Protection Policy. As
international law the regime directly addresses States. However,
private and non-governmental activities are addressed by space
law because, while private activities are governed directly by
national law these national regimes sit within the framework
of international law, specifically the “special regime” (lex specialis)
of international space law. Space law was first developed through
customary international law dating from at least the first instance
of state practice, the launch of Sputnik, and strengthened by the
Declaration of Legal Principles in 1963 (United Nations General
Assembly. Resolution A/RES/1962 (XVIII), 1962) but the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 is a milestone as a formally binding or “hard
law” instrument which serves as the legal foundation for the space
governance regime. The Outer Space Treaty, as its full name
implies is a framework treaty laying out key principles. It has been
built upon by subsequent treaties focusing on specific aspects,
such as elaborating liability and registration provisions. The
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement) (Moon
Agreement 1979) was an attempt to develop a more detailed
and specific regime for activities on the Moon and other celestial
bodies but despite receiving sufficient ratifications to become an
active treaty it has been rejected by the majority of the
international community. It is therefore regarded as a “failed”
treaty and is of limited relevance. The decades after the Moon
Agreement have seen a dearth of “hard law” instruments in space
governance. What development there have been has come in the
form of customary international law and non-binding
instruments or so-called “soft law.” The COSPAR Planetary
Protection Policy (PPP) is one of the leading examples of “soft
law” within space governance.
The key aspects of the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967) for
planetary protection are found in Articles I, II, III, VI, VIII, and
IX. Article I declares that all States are free to explore and use
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Such
exploration and use should be “carried out for the benefit and in
the interest of all countries” and States should “facilitate and
encourage international cooperation” in scientific investigation.
Article II prohibits the exercise of territorial sovereignty in outer
space or on the Moon and other celestial bodies. It also means
that the use or occupation of outer space, the Moon and other
celestial bodies, gives rise to no sovereign rights over those areas.
Article III stipulates that space law is part of international law,
and therefore where space law “runs out” international law can be
used to “fill the gaps.” This is particularly important for
enforcement, as it means, among other things, while there is
not specific “dispute resolution” mechanism in the Outer Space
Treaty states can make use of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other such measures. Article VI is vital for modern
international space law as it makes States responsible for the
activities of their nationals and private corporations in outer
space and requires that they “authorize” and “continually
supervise” those activities. Similarly, Article VIII establishes
that the State on whose registry a space object is carried
“retains jurisdiction and control” over the space object and its
personnel. Therefore the “state of registry” is able to exercise legal
authority over a space object (and its personnel should it have
any) despite Article II OST. Article IX is the most directly relevant
for this discussion and will therefore be subject to a more detailed
examination.
Article IX stipulates that States shall conduct their activities
“with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other”
parties. They conduct their activities so as to avoid the “harmful
contamination” of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as
TABLE 1 | Categories of missions and target as stated in (new 2020 ref).
Category Mission type Target bodies
I Flyby, orbiter, lander Undifferentiated, metamorphosed asteroids; Io
II Flyby, orbiter, lander Venus; Moon; Comets; Carbonaceous Chondrite Asteroids;
Jupiter; Saturn; Uranus; Neptune; Ganymedea; Callisto; Titana;
Tritona; Pluto/Charona; Ceres; Kuiper-Belt Objects >½ the size of
Plutoa; Kuiper-Belt Objects <½ the size of Pluto; others
III Flyby, Orbiters Mars; Europa; Enceladus
IV Lander Missions Mars; Europa; Enceladus
V Any Earth-return mission —
aMust be supported by an analysis of the “remote” potential for contamination of the liquid-water environments that may exist beneath their surfaces.
Frontiers in Astronomy and Space Sciences | www.frontiersin.org November 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 5898173
Cheney et al. PP in New Space Era
changes to the Earth’s environment by the introduction of
“extraterrestrial matter”. Further, states are encouraged to
engage in “appropriate international consultations” to avoid
“harmful interference” with the activities of other States. As is
the case with most of the provisions of the space treaties, “harmful
contamination” and “harmful interference” are not defined by the
Outer Space Treaty itself. While their ‘ordinary meaning (using
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (VCLT,
1969) approach) seems reasonably clear, particularly based on the
dictionary definitions (OED 2011: 308, 651), it remains unclear as
to what needs to be subject to the harm in question?
Environmental law is particularly focused upon harm to “life”
whether directly or indirectly. Based on the subsequent practice of
the conduct of the various mission to the Moon, and other
celestial bodies, the interpretation that can be drawn from
State practice is that “harmful contamination” is about
biological contamination of celestial bodies particularly where
and when there is “potential” for life or related indicators.
Therefore, it would be a stretch to interpret “harmful
contamination” as being the “contamination” of the celestial
body itself per se. This also leads to a conclusion that different
approaches are in order for different celestial bodies given the
different “environmental” conditions on those bodies (the
presence of an atmosphere makes Mars different from the
Moon for example) (Newman 2015: 35–36). However, what
standards are necessary to meet the requirements of Article IX
are an open question. It seems logical to adopt an “evolutionary
approach” to the interpretation of Article IX given the technical
nature of the issue. To use, say “planetary protection” standards
applied to the Viking landers in 1975 would ignore the
developments in both sterilization and the understanding of
the outer space environment(s) in the intervening 45 years.
There are planetary protection polices, in addition to the
COSPAR PPP, which have been implemented, and can be
viewed as ‘subsequent practice’ and therefore help to define
the meaning of the terms of the Outer Space Treaty. NASA,
the European Space Agency and the Japanese Space Agency
(JAXA) all have their own internal policies. These only apply
to those agencies and their associated missions, so commercial
missions are not necessarily subject to those policies. As
mentioned, States are responsible for the activities of their
nationals in outer space and required to authorize and
supervise those activities. Therefore, non-governmental
missions are required to “avoid harmful contamination” as per
Article IX OST. The practice of the various space agencies should
be viewed as “subsequent practice” and therefore form a baseline
of what should be expected of states to require of non-
governmental actors in order to secure the necessary
authorisations to conduct a space activity. However, unless
those States choose to do so there is no obligation to
implement COSPAR’s PPP. Yet it is important to note the
broad acceptance and general adherence to the principles, and
indeed, the COSPAR PPP is a respected technically driven
international set of guidelines.
As the relevant space agencies operate their own policies and
no State has opted to incorporate COSPAR’s PPP into their
national laws their value as customary international law is
limited. However, “soft-law” is a growing part of the space
governance infrastructure, and particularly in technical arenas
such as “planetary protection” can be a useful approach especially
for emerging governance issues. Indeed, Setsuko Aoki argues that
soft law, such as the COSPAR PPP, is often best suited for
technical guidelines, it reduces the need for compromise, and
can be more easily updated than hard law options (Aoki 2012:
72–73). COPSAR’s PPP is an exemplary example of such
technically driven guidelines and should serve as a model for
such “soft law” instruments.
New Space and the Problem of
Enforcement
Up until the middle years of the 2010s, it was inconceivable that a
private company would become seriously engaged in the
exploration of celestial bodies other than the Moon within the
foreseeable future. The proliferation of private companies seeking
to “Mine the Skies” (Lewis 1997) and unlock a prospective
trillion-dollar space-resource was greeted with a hopeful but
realistic recognition of the difficulties. The size of the
investment required coupled with the vast infrastructure needs
of space mining meant such ventures would be difficult to bring
to fruition, and the troubles experienced by companies like
Planetary Resources did little to dampen those doubts (Foust
2019).
So, while the exploitation of celestial bodies has been in the
zeitgeist of the space community, the aforementioned financial
realpolitik meant that journeys to celestial bodies remained the
province of the scientific and academic actors. The natural
corollary of this was that the COSPAR PPP became firmly
embedded as the international standard by which
contamination of celestial bodies would be avoided. In the
United States, for example, no NASA probe will be launched
into space without receiving prior approval from the NASA
Planetary Protection Officer (Butler 2006: p. 1357). Therefore,
while COSPAR PPP is entirely voluntary in nature, and it is not
enshrined within the OST regime, there has been broad
compliance it by both regulators and mission planners eager
not to contaminate a potentially pristine extraterrestrial
environment.
This scientific hegemony in respect of planetary protection is
not guaranteed to continue in perpetuity, however. The first
signs of a serious attempt by the private sector to engage in
missions that would require adherence to the principles of
planetary protection came at the 2016 International
Astronomical Congress, where Elon Musk outlined his plan
to colonize Mars using rockets built by his company SpaceX
(Newman and Williamson, 2018). Unlike some of the other
ventures, Musk has the financial resources and SpaceX has
evidenced significant technological prowess to make the
space community pay serious attention to Musk’s proposals.
Given that Musk has previously made it clear that he has no
great attachment to the planetary protection protocols, believing
there is no life onMars (Berger, 2015), there a distinct possibility
that those looking to explore other celestial bodies for
commercial reasons will eschew the restrictive requirements
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of the COSPAR PPP in favor of a more relaxed approach to
planetary protection.
It is not only Musk from the private sector who seeks to
challenge the COSPAR regime. In February 2019, the Arch
Mission Foundation, a non-profit, independent organization
created a “Lunar Library” archive for Israel and secured a
launch berth on the Beresheet mission. This was the first
attempt at a lunar lander from Israel and was the result of
funding from a range of philanthropic organizations and
private investment. The mission itself was a failure, with the
spacecraft crashing into the lunar surface (Foust 2019b).
However, in August 2019, Nova Spivack, the founder of the
Arch Mission Foundation, announced that among the payload
(which was, as proposed to the regulator–in this case the
UnitedStates’ FAA–a DVD-sized archive containing 30 million
pages of information and DNA) was a number of tardigrades, the
small microscopic lifeforms that are highly resilient to all manner
of conditions in space that would normally be considered inimical
to most life forms (Oberhaus 2019). In a later interview, Spivack
further declared that the other launch partners, or the space
agencies were unaware of the presence of tardigrades. He claimed
that he wanted to take the risk to see how life behaved and would
“ask for forgiveness rather than permission” (Taylor 2019).
The lack of disclosure of the existence of the tardigrades casts
doubt upon the compliance of the Beresheet mission to the
planetary protection guidelines. Missions to the Moon are
classed as Category II under the COSPAR PPP (Table 1). This
requires the creation of a planetary protection plan and “a series
of reports both pre-launch report, post-launch report, post-
encounter report, and an end-of mission report” (Johnson
et al., 2019). While the actions of Spivack and the Arch
Mission Foundation were clearly aimed at sidestepping the
COSPAR guidelines, the reaction of the international
community to the seeding of the Moon with tardigrades was a
mixture of curiosity and outrage, but little in the way of
substantive action.
Recent developments beg the question as to how secure the
principles of planetary protection will be if challenged by
adventurous entrepreneurs, unfettered by the constraints of
the scientific community. The recent NASA Planetary
Protection Independent Review Board (NASA 2019) has led to
the announcement of a reframing of the COSPAR guidelines for
the Artemis program (NASA 2020a), but even these revivified
proposals may be too cautious for those who are prepared to risk
some contamination in exchange for commercial developments.
While guidelines provide a suitable mechanism for establishing
approved behavior within a specific community of practice, they
are ultimately non-binding and not designed to be enforced when
actors refuse to adhere to the norms of a group to which they
themselves do not belong. In essence, guidelines rely on “carrots”
rather than “sticks” (Goh, 2008).
Johnson et al. (2019) highlight that although the COSPAR PPP
is not binding on any State, that does not mean they cannot be
voluntarily adopted by States and then implemented through
national legislation or licensing requirements. This is where the
legal status of the COSPAR PPP becomes somewhat opaque.
Internationally, they do not have the binding force of a treaty,
but once a nation decides to incorporate the principles within
their licensing regime, it could be unlawful for either an
individual or a company to act in a way which is not in
accordance with a license (see, for example, United Kingdom
Outer Space Act 1986, s3).
Licensing is an inherent requirement of international space
law. As stated previously, the five UN space treaties seek to
regulate the behavior of States, establishing the obligations and
positive rights of States in the peaceful uses and exploration of
outer space (Marboe 2017: p 131). Indeed, this is one of the three
core principles around which the OST is located; freedom of
exploration, the requirement that exploration and use is
undertaken for peaceful purposes and that states are
responsible for national space activities (Masson-Zwann 2017:
p 2). It is therefore fundamental to the overarching international
regime that State parties to the OST agree to take on responsibility
not only for state-sponsored missions, but also non-
governmental entities. The provisions of Article VI of the
Treaty ensure that the principles of the OST are embedded
within all space activity, be it public or private in nature:
“State parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national space activities in outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
whether such activities are carried out by governmental
agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the
present Treaty.”
As with much of the OST, this provision represented a
compromise between the two dominant powers of the time of
drafting: the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). The
USSR at the time believed that only a nation state, “conscious of
its intention responsibility should carry on space activities.”
(Hobe et al., 2009: p 106). This is particularly germane when
considering notions of planetary exploration as for much of the
life of the OST, it was believed that it is only nation states that
would either be capable or interested in exploring the Moon or
other celestial bodies.
As Johnson et al. (2019) point out, the “attribution to the State
is direct and automatic. Article VI of the OST makes States
internationally responsible for the actions of. . .private actors
such as corporations, non-profit foundations or others not
acting in a governmental capacity”. It is the second sentence
of Article VI that creates the need for a licensing and regulatory
framework within the domestic legislation of State Parties to the
OST. It states that “The activities of non-governmental entities in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies shall
require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty”. As can be seen,
therefore, Article VI creates a positive obligation upon the
State to make sure that all non-governmental activities are
monitored to ensure compliance with the terms of the OST.
The fact that the principles of planetary protection are not
contained within a binding international treaty is, therefore,
not fatal to the prospects of ensuring compliance. Indeed, the
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fluid nature of scientific opinion means that a non-treaty
agreement can incorporate changes, such as those proposed
by the Stern review (NASA, 2019), as scientific opinion
changes and develops without the need to open a treaty up
for renegotiation. As Goh (2008) highlights, there is a danger
that a poorly constructed and overly restrictive treaty could be
prone to premature failure, leaving a significant gap in
normative guidance. Non-treaty agreements and guidelines
constitute a versatile pre-droit regime that can capture and
galvanize developments in the field.
By having States as the guarantors of compliance with the
treaty, national regulators have to bear in mind scientific best
practice when thinking about the authorization of space missions
(Lyall and Larsen 2018). The COSPAR PPP is recognized across
the world, and - perhaps more importantly–throughout the
scientific community as being the best way to capture
developments in scientific understanding. This, in turn, will
equip national regulators, who have a duty to authorize and
oversee all aspects of anymission by their nationals or companies,
with the guidance to deal with each mission on a granular level. It
is surely logical for nations to incorporate COSPAR guidelines
within the extant licensing mechanisms (as the FAA do with their
payload reviews and the United Kingdom Space Agency do by
virtue of s5 (2) (e) (i) Outer Space Act 1986). Doing this and
discharging the supervisory duty under Article VI of the OST,
means that approval of missions remains within the competency
of States.
What then of the tardigrades and the threat posed to planetary
protection by hyper-wealthy entrepreneurs? According to Article
VI of the OST, the Beresheet mission was part of a payload
launched from the United States (it is important to distinguish the
responsibility for the mission from liability under Article VII,
however in this case, the FAA in the United States would consider
the launch a national space activity and therefore would provide
authorization under Article VI as well as being a launching state
under Article VII). As the mission involved the activity of an
Israeli not-for-profit foundation, both Israel and the United States
would be internationally responsible under Article VI of the OST
(Johnson et al., 2019). It is, therefore, for their regulators to decide
what action should be taken against the Beresheet mission for the
presence of unauthorized tardigrades.
Article VI imposes the positive obligation upon States to
license non-governmental actors (of whatever kind) for any
area of a space mission. The OST requires consideration to be
paid to scientific information, especially regarding the
contamination of outer space (Lyall and Larsen, 2018). That
the COSPAR PPP are not binding upon States and merely
persuasive is something of a red herring. Any regulator
wishing to be seen as responsible ignores the findings of
COSPAR at their peril. In the current geopolitical
environment, having planetary protection as part of
consideration of the granting of a launch license is as close to
enforcement as can be realistically hoped for. The burden now
passes to individual States to ensure that its nationals and its
companies do not engage in exploration that endangers the
scientific value of celestial bodies.
Environmental Framework for Outer
Space?
In light of the increasing interest in the Moon and other celestial
bodies by non-governmental actors, for activities other than
scientific investigation, it is worth considering whether there
should be a broader “environmental” consideration embodied
in the conceptualization of planetary protection, i.e. widen its
remit. Increased lunar activities could replicate Earth’s “space
debris problem” around the Moon (and later Mars); lunar dust,
kicked up by activities on the surface could be a significant
environmental issue (Grush, 2019); not to mention the
“damage” mining operations will cause to hereto pristine
environments. Positioning “planetary protection” as more than
just a question of protecting scientific integrity but part of a
broader “environmental protection” regime for outer space will
strengthen the case for such measures. It will broaden the
stakeholders and help guard against an ambivalence toward
the objectives of astrobiology.
There has been a clear lack of recognition of the nature of outer
space as an environment, doing so provides a framework for
understanding and protecting outer space as an arena for human
activity. The “Stern Report” (NASA 2019) draws the boundaries
between scientific and commercial space endeavors. There is a
recognition of the multi-purpose nature of space activities
(commercial, scientific, prestige etc.) but there has not been a
sufficiently persuasive argument for the protection of the space
environment itself.
While outer space in undoubtedly a unique environment, it is,
as discussed, within the scope of international law and therefore
under the auspices of the “international community”. Central to
this international order are the principles set out in the UN
Charter of a duty to cooperate, conduct peaceful international
relations and a commitment to the rule of law in global
governance. The Outer Space Treaty repeatedly reaffirms these
principles, particularly the duty to cooperate in the exploration
and use of outer space. Article III OST firmly cements space law
within the wider general international legal regime with the UN
Charter as its foundation. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to draw
upon principles in other fields of international law as models for
addressing environmental problems in space law.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (UNCLOS 1982) is frequently used as an analogue
regime for outer space. There are numerous similarities between
the law of the sea (particularly as it pertains to the high seas) and
the law of outer space. Both the high seas and outer space are
“areas beyond territorial jurisdiction” and generally regarded as
res communis or part of the global commons. A key example of
the similarities can be seen between the right of peaceful passage
in UNCLOS and Article I of the Outer Space Treaty which
provides for a right of free access to all areas of outer space,
the Moon and other celestial bodies for all States. A link can even
be made to the need to tackle the space debris issue if conceived of
as a “hazard to navigation” that potentially impedes the “free
access” to outer space.
International environmental law is a useful source for a model
or analogue for the development of a more “environmentally”
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minded space law regime. Similar to outer space, international
environmental law has a set of core treaties which have been
advanced and developed by non-binding “soft law” instruments,
with a limited role for customary international law. While
international environmental law is not directly applicable to
outer space, it can serve as a model for space law, and the
core principles can be transliterated to the space law regime.
Further, if these principles of environmental law become further
established as customary international law within general
international law then they may become applicable to space law.
As it currently stands, with the exception of the “failed”Moon
Agreement, Article IX OST is the central pillar of ‘space
environmental law’ and it offers little help. However, it does
introduce a requirement of principle of “appropriate
international consultation”, and “due regard”, but given the
paucity of details within Article IX OST there needs to be
further elaboration of what is meant these terms. As discussed
above, States can take a proactive role in this, particularly with
respect to non-governmental actors such as commercial entities;
they can require “environmental impact assessments” or similar
measures as part of their national licencing process.
Further, UN guidelines are critical in providing this
elaboration and are “a prudent and necessary step toward
preserving the outer space environment for future generations”
(United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
2007). These guidelines should draw on the principles of wider
international law, and international environmental law more
specifically. Positive action taken at the UN and by the
international space community would have the additional
advantage of demonstrating intent to “import” or “transliterate”
principles that are not necessarily firmly established in customary
international law. This would serve the objective of creating an
environmental framework to protect space for the future, maintain
the viability of scientific endeavors, limit harm to all States and to
equally and adequately allow growth of space activity sustainably
and economically. This would serve not just to protect the scientific
value of outer space as intended by the planetary protection
principles espoused by COSPAR and others but would also
ensure the sustainability of all outer space activities.
Space is a fragile environment; it lacks many of the “naturally
restorative” processes that exist in terrestrial environment and
therefore needs extra care. It is therefore important to place the
maintenance and protection of the space environment at the
forefront of the space governance regime. Outer space is already
an important part of the global economy and will only become
more important. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that the use
of space is undertaken on a sustainable footing, to ensure its
continued availability. However, the concept sustainability is a
debated one, and there are many differing visions of what
“sustainable” means. Inherent to the concept of “sustainable,”
at least in international environmental law, is that use or
exploitation of natural resources can continue however, the
needs of future generations and the broader environment must
be taken into account (Dupuy and Vinuales 2018: 91–92).
Moreover, sustainability, by definition, includes an ecological,
economic, and social component, which seems widely accepted.
As has been explored, even with the provisions of Article IX
OST, space law is limited in terms of specific measures to protect
the space environment. Space is an environment; a fragile
environment in need of greater protection. However, general
international law, the Law of the Sea, and international
environmental law all provide principles and models for how
the space environment can be afforded greater protection. Any
international governance measure is only as strong as those that
support it, and therefore it is important to build broad support for
any measure. That need, combined with a need to allow measures
to develop and adapt over time based on new science and
technology, lends support for any space environmental
instrument to be rooted in “soft law.” The COSPAR PPP
demonstrate the potential of such measures. States should
recall that outer space is a unique and fragile resource. It is
imperative that its continued use and development be undertaken
in a sustainable manner.
CONCLUSION
The discovery of extraterrestrial life, in whatever form, will
undoubtedly be one of, if not the, most seminal scientific
discovery in human history, it is therefore imperative that the
integrity of that finding is as unimpeachable as is possible.
COSPAR’s PPP and allied efforts are central to that.
Paradoxically, the inherent responsiveness that is its greatest
strength is also potentially its fatal weakness. That COSPAR is
an expert driven process which generates technical guidelines that
are adaptive to circumstances and scientific development and that
both makes them an exemplary example of ‘soft law’ and has
furnished them with high regard within the scientific community.
As non-binding guidelines they are followed because space
exploration agencies and mission planners recognize their
value as “good practice” for scientists. The Achilles heel in this
is that actors who see themselves as outside of this community
and who do not care about protecting the scientific integrity of
outer space, will not feel obliged to adhere to the guidelines. This
situation is not terminal, however, as States have the ability, and
the responsibility to ensure respect for the guidelines through
Article VI of the OST and the resultant licencing process.
Furthermore, as can be seen from the above discussion, States
would benefit from promoting the COSPAR PPP as a model. This
expert led, adaptive process is a model for other areas of space
governance to follow particularly as outer space becoming
increasingly commercial and non-governmental. It is also
sensible, as this transition occurs, to consider a broader
“environmental” framework for outer space to ensure that
there is not a repeat of the space debris problem around other
celestial bodies, among other issues. The incentive for States to act
is clear: there will be significant national prestige for the mission
that discovers the existence of extraterrestrial life. The many
missions to other worlds have shown that adhering to the
COSPAR PPP does not prevent activity but it may be vital to
establishing the provenance of any discovery of
extraterrestrial life.
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